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ABSTRACT 
 
This case study follows the security breach that affected Target at the end of 2013 and resulted in the loss of financial data for 
over 70 million customers. The case provides an overview of the company and describes the reasons that led to one of the biggest 
security breaches in history. It offers a discussion on Target’s vendor management processes and the vulnerability at Fazio 
Mechanical Services that was among the main causes of the breach. Further, the case introduces the incident response plan 
implemented by Target and discusses the aftermath of the attack. The lessons learned describe some of the steps the company 
took to mitigate risks in the future and to strengthen its security posture. While the breach had a significant impact on Target, the 
organization was able to fully recover from it and develop best practices that are now widely implemented by other retailers. The 
case is suitable for both undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in information security or information systems courses that 
discuss vendor management, security incident response, or general security program administration topics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are numerous definitions of information security, but 
many of them revolve around achieving confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the information and/or systems 
(Anderson, 2003; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000; Sumra, 
Hasbullah, and AbManan, 2015; Von Solms and Van Niekerk, 
2013). These goals are important, as they provide trust and 
guarantee the safety of data in motion and data at rest.  
Within the retail industry, information security is critical 
as it ensures that the organizations follow best practices and 
can protect the personal and financial information of the 
customers. As Greig, Renaud, and Flowerday (2015) point 
out, a focus on employee behavior is vital since an 
“organization’s success or failure effectively depends on the 
things that its employees do or fail to do” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 
2010). Security culture has the potential to play a significant 
role in this respect (Vroom and Von Solms, 2004). A strong 
and effective security culture is in place when every employee 
performs daily tasks in a secure manner and such secure 
behavior is considered to be ‘the norm’ (Von Solms, 2000). 
Demonstrating a strong security posture is especially 
important for retail companies because they rely on having 
positive brand recognition and gaining the customers’ trust. A 
security breach at a big retail company can also have a domino 
effect and potentially impact many other corporations in a 
negative way. Thus, understanding the critically important 
factors in building a strong security culture and following best 
practices is essential for any retail company. 
 
2. MOTIVATION 
 
The authors’ motivation to write this case study comes from 
the need to incorporate real world examples into the 
cybersecurity curriculum. While it is important for students to 
master terminology and have solid foundational knowledge, 
the authors believe they should also be able to apply the 
knowledge to actual organizational settings where information 
security issues arise. There has been a myriad of breaches 
affecting a wide range of companies and individuals (Home 
Depot, JP Morgan Chase, Ashley Madison, the Office of 
Personnel and Management, eBay, Sony, and Hillary Clinton), 
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but there are relatively few case studies developed solely for 
use in the classroom with accompanying learning objectives 
and teaching notes. Thus, the authors wanted to explore the 
recent security breach at Target due to the abundance of 
information available and the various angles from which the 
students can approach the topic. 
 
3. EVALUATION 
 
After drafting the case text, it was distributed to students in an 
information security principles course at a medium-sized, 
private university in the US. Thirty eight undergraduate 
students were presented with the case text and reflection 
questions (provided in the teaching notes).  Students’ analyses 
of the case and reflection questions were collected as part of a 
graded assignment and were evaluated using rubrics to 
determine whether students exceeded, met, or did not meet 
expectations across various learning objectives. The authors 
also provided students with a paper survey that included 
several open-ended questions. The authors asked them to 
describe what they liked and disliked about the case, whether 
any additional information should be provided, whether they 
have any suggestions for improvement, and what sources they 
used when preparing their analyses. Overall, students provided 
very positive feedback on the case write-up. Students 
expressed some concern over the discussion of vendor 
management processes, and therefore additional detail around 
the vendor management processes was added to the case.   
In terms of performance against leaning outcomes, the 
average grade students received on this assignment was 94%, 
which exceeds expectations. More specifically, 1 student did 
not meet the expectations (<65%), 9 students met the 
expectations (65-89%), and 28 students exceeded the 
expectations (>90%). These results indicate that students were 
able to successfully perform the case study analysis, 
understand and interpret the main issues, and provide feasible 
and adequate solutions for improving the security practice at 
Target Corp. The authors evaluated the students’ writing 
skills, as well as their ability to support their statements with 
additional resources, readings, and integrate previous course 
content in their analysis. The authors used TurnItIn to avoid 
any plagiarism on the assignment, and the grading rubrics 
were adapted from the University’s College of Business 
recommended rubric for problem solving. 
 
4. CASE SYNOPSYS  
 
At the end of 2013, amid the holiday shopping season, Target 
became a victim of a security breach affecting over 70 million 
customers. Their personal and financial data was stolen 
through a vulnerability in one of Target’s vendors – Fazio 
Mechanical Services. The breach was first reported by the 
security journalist Brian Krebs, and Target’s official response 
came shortly after the announcement. While slightly late, the 
company’s incident management was still successful as they 
were able to regain the customers’ trust and maintain their 
status as a successful retailer. After the attack, Target 
implemented several steps to mitigate any future breaches. 
The company created a Cyber Fusion Center, provided free 
credit card monitoring for its customers, and implemented 
POS terminals with chip readers. These steps demonstrate 
Target’s efforts to improve its security and minimize the risk 
of other attacks in the future.  
The structure of the presented case study is as follows: 
Target’s company profile, the timeline of the events, the 
company’s business processes before and after the breach 
(including vendor management and incident response), the 
investigation, the fallout, and lessons learned. 
 
5. CASE TEXT 
 
5.1 Company Profile 
With its first store opening in Roseville, Minnesota, on May 1, 
1962, Target aimed to differentiate itself by providing many 
features of traditional department stores but provide low prices 
typically associated with discount retailers. The name Target 
was chosen purposefully as Stewart Widdess (Director of 
Publicity) states “As a marksman’s goal is to hit the center 
bulls-eye, the new store would do much the same in terms of 
retail goods, services, commitment to the community, price, 
value and overall experience” (Target, 2017). The company 
went public on October 18, 1967, (under the name “Dayton 
Corporation”) and began expanding across the country. 
Through various acquisitions and expansions into new areas of 
the country, Target has become the second-largest discount 
retailer in the United States (behind Walmart). As of February 
1, 2014, Target operated 1,793 retail store locations in the 
United States, employed approximately 360,000 employees, 
and had annual revenues of $72.6 billion (Statista, 2015).  
Target’s slogan of “Expect more. Pay less.” embodies 
their corporate mission of providing great value to its 
customers while maintaining an exceptional shopping 
experience. A key component of Target’s strategy for creating 
an exceptional experience for both customers and employees 
is to always behave ethically and with integrity. Their efforts 
to be a responsible corporate citizen have earned various 
awards such as inclusion on Fortune Magazine’s “20 Most 
Generous Companies of the Fortune 500” and “World’s Most 
Admired Companies” lists (Target, 2017). 
While Target has worked diligently to position itself as a 
leading retailer in the United States with prominent charitable 
values, they have certainly experienced hardships throughout 
their long history. Notably, in 2013, they suffered a massive 
data breach that exposed sensitive financial information for 
millions of customers. While the data breach significantly 
affected Target’s operations, the company has recovered and 
has learned many valuable lessons on the importance of 
protecting sensitive information. 
 
5.2 Before the Breach 
Like many corporations, Target employed a staff of dedicated 
security professionals to implement safeguards to protect 
sensitive data. As part of their ongoing security efforts, Target 
successfully passed a compliance audit for the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) in September of 
2013 (Riley et al., 2014). PCI audits involve a review of 
critical security controls and systems configurations to verify 
that best practices for protecting payment card information on 
computer systems is maintained. Target also completed the 
implementation of a $1.6 million malware detection tool 
developed by the cybersecurity company FireEye in 2013 
(Riley et al., 2014). Their security operations center, with 
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teams of personnel in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Bangalore, 
India, provided round-the-clock monitoring of cybersecurity 
threats on the network. While there is no method for ensuring 
complete protection against cybersecurity threats, Target 
appeared to be following industry best practices and had 
reasonable security controls in place. 
 
5.3 Breach Notification and Initial Response 
On November 30, 2013, security operations personnel in 
Bangalore, India, received a notification from their malware 
detection software that some potentially malicious activity was 
recorded on the network. The alert was shared with security 
personnel in Minneapolis, but no further action was taken.  
Another alert was raised on December 2, 2013, but again no 
action was taken (Riley et al., 2014). It was not until 
December 12, 2013, when the U.S. Department of Justice 
contacted Target about a possible data breach on their 
network, that Target began investigating the issue in earnest. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Secret 
Service joined the investigation as well. While no public 
disclosure was made at the time, the independent security 
researcher and blogger, Brian Krebs, posted information 
regarding a possible breach of the Target network on 
December 18, 2013. On December 19, 2013, Target issued the 
following public statement on the matter: 
 
Target today confirmed it is aware of unauthorized 
access to payment card data that may have impacted 
certain guests making credit and debit card purchases 
in its U.S. stores. Target is working closely with law 
enforcement and financial institutions, and has 
identified and resolved the issue. 
“Target’s first priority is preserving the trust of 
our guests and we have moved swiftly to address this 
issue, so guests can shop with confidence. We regret 
any inconvenience this may cause,” said Gregg 
Steinhafel, chairman, president and chief executive 
officer, Target. “We take this matter very seriously 
and are working with law enforcement to bring those 
responsible to justice.” 
Approximately 40 million credit and debit card 
accounts may have been impacted between Nov. 27 
and Dec. 15, 2013. Target alerted authorities and 
financial institutions immediately after it was made 
aware of the unauthorized access, and is putting all 
appropriate resources behind these efforts. Among 
other actions, Target is partnering with a leading third-
party forensics firm to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the incident. 
 
Initially, Target denied that debit card PIN numbers had 
been stolen, but reports confirmed that encrypted PIN numbers 
had indeed been stolen (Finkle and Henry, 2013). Another 
update (Target, 2014) on the breach was provided by the 
company a month later, on January 10, 2014, outlining the fact 
that personal information (names, addresses, phone numbers, 
and email addresses) were also taken in this breach. While 
there were some critiques about the fact that the company 
delayed its response after initially identifying the breach, 
Target Chairman and CEO Gregg Steinhafel defended the 
decision: 
Sunday (Dec. 15) was really day one. That was the 
day we confirmed we had an issue and so our number 
one priority was ... making our environment safe and 
secure. By six o’clock at night, our environment was 
safe and secure. We eliminated the malware in the 
access point, we were very confident that coming into 
Monday guests could come to Target and shop with 
confidence and no risk.  
Day two was really about initiating the 
investigation work and the forensic work ... that has 
been ongoing. Day three was about preparation. We 
wanted to make sure our stores and our call centers 
could be as prepared as possible, and day four was 
about notification. (Quick, 2014) 
 
In addition to the public response, Target sent out an email 
to its customers (Appendix A) on January 16, 2014, offering 
one year of free credit monitoring. The company provided 
them with information about protecting themselves and 
staying safe. However, the email was sent to many individuals 
who never had conducted business with Target, which raised 
speculation as to how the retailer obtained the data. One 
possible explanation is that perhaps the email addresses were 
from Amazon, a remnant from the old Amazon-Target 
partnership. However, when consumers asked where Target 
obtained email addresses for people who are not now and have 
never been customers of the retailer, the spokeswoman simply 
said, “The information was obtained by Target through the 
normal course of our business” (Quirk, 2014). Instead of 
retaining its customers and solidifying their trust with the 
offered incentives, Target opened another door for 
speculations on its processes for collecting and handling 
customer data. 
 
5.4 The Investigation 
As part of the incident response process, Target commissioned 
security professionals at Verizon to assist in the investigation 
into how the breach occurred. A detailed security audit was 
performed from December 21, 2013, to March 1, 2014, and 
served two primary purposes: 1) identify the root cause of the 
breach and 2) identify opportunities to improve the security of 
Target’s infrastructure. While the report issued by Verizon has 
remained confidential, various media outlets claimed to have 
received information stemming directly from the report. The 
findings presented below have not been confirmed by Target, 
but have been reported by several reputable security 
researchers and media outlets. 
The initial point of entry appears to have stemmed from 
hijacked credentials stolen from Fazio Mechanical Services, a 
third party service provider. Fazio, a supplier of refrigeration 
devices and services, began working with Target to support 
the expansion of fresh food offerings across stores in the 
United States. As with many other vendors and suppliers of 
Target, Fazio was provided access to Target’s systems to 
handle “electronic billing, contract submission, and project 
management.” Fazio Mechanical did not, however, “perform 
remote monitoring or control of heating, cooling, or 
refrigeration systems for Target” (Fazio Mechanical Services, 
2014).  
In the fall of 2013, Fazio Mechanical Services was the 
“victim of a sophisticated cyber-attack operation” despite 
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stating that their “IT system and security measures are in full 
compliance with industry best practices” (Fazio Mechanical 
Services, 2014). Industry experts believe the breach involved 
an infection of the ‘Citadel’ malware that can be used to steal 
logon credentials from computer systems. Despite a claim that 
Fazio was in compliance with “industry best practices,” it has 
been alleged that Fazio relied on the free, non-commercial 
version of Malwarebytes Anti-Malware software, which does 
not provide real-time protection. It is not clear whether Target 
enforced any ongoing security reviews of its vendors to ensure 
compliance with security best practices.   
While this attack did not appear to have an immediate 
impact on Fazio, it is likely that account credentials for 
accessing Target systems were stolen during the Fazio breach.  
Access to Target’s systems granted to Fazio would not have 
allowed attackers to access customer data, however, so 
additional vulnerabilities inside the Target network must have 
allowed attackers to escalate their account privileges, traverse 
the network, and obtain over 40 million customer card 
numbers. 
Further investigation revealed that there were no major 
obstacles to accessing point of sale (POS) terminals across the 
entire network once inside the internal Target network. This 
lack of network segmentation could allow any malicious user 
the ability to traverse the network and attempt to access 
various devices ranging from point of sale terminals to 
mission critical back-end systems. To illustrate the lack of 
segmentation, the Verizon audit team supposedly accessed a 
cash register after they compromised a deli counter scale that 
was located in a different store (Krebs, 2015).  
The audit team also found significant problems with 
enforcement of password policies. Target maintained a 
password policy that included industry-standard practices, 
however investigators found multiple files stored on Target 
servers that included logon credentials for various systems. 
According to Brian Krebs, the audit report revealed that 
 
The Verizon security consultants identified several 
systems that were using misconfigured services, such 
as several Microsoft SQL servers that had a weak 
administrator password, and Apache Tomcat servers 
using the default administrator password. Through 
these weaknesses, the Verizon consultants were able 
to gain initial access to the corporate network and to 
eventually gain domain administrator access. (Krebs, 
2015)  
 
The use of weak passwords was apparently rampant within the 
Target infrastructure, and the security investigation team was 
able to crack over 500,000 passwords, representing 86% of 
identified accounts, to various internal Target systems.  
Investigators also identified significant issues related to 
the maintenance and patching of systems. Again, Brian Krebs 
claims:  
 
For example, the Verizon consultants found systems 
missing critical Microsoft patches, or running outdated 
[web server] software such as Apache, IBM 
WebSphere, and PHP. These services were hosted on 
web servers, databases, and other critical 
infrastructure. These services have many known 
vulnerabilities associated with them. In several of 
these instances where Verizon discovered these 
outdated services or unpatched systems, they were 
able to gain access to the affected systems without 
needing to know any authentication credentials. 
Verizon and the Target Red Team exploited several 
vulnerabilities on the internal network, from an 
unauthenticated standpoint. The consultants were able 
to use this initial access to compromise additional 
systems. Information on these additional systems 
eventually led to Verizon gaining full access to the 
network – and all sensitive data stored at on network 
shares – through a domain administrator account. 
(Krebs, 2015) 
 
Given the previously stated vulnerabilities, the attackers 
were able to access point of sale terminals and install malware 
directly on all machines across the network. Given the timing 
of the alerts triggered by Target’s anti-malware software in 
late November and early December, it is likely that the 
malware was installed on the terminals at this time. 
The malware contained memory-scraping functionality 
that allowed the attackers to intercept cardholder information 
before it was sent for processing by a payment processor. The 
PCI-DSS specifically requires payment card processors to 
“encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public 
networks” (Security Standards Council, 2016). However, the 
configuration of point of sale terminals at Target did not 
provide the ability to immediately encrypt cardholder data 
upon registering a card swipe. Because of this, card data 
remained in plain text within the POS terminal’s memory.  
This data was only encrypted upon preparation for transit to 
external card processing systems (as required under PCI-
DSS). Since the malware was installed directly on POS 
terminals and allowed the ability to scrape data from memory 
of these machines, the attackers were able to intercept 
unencrypted cardholder data for all card swipes registered in 
Target stores. 
 
5.5 The Fallout 
Target has claimed that up to 70 million individuals may have 
been impacted by this data breach (Target, 2015a). At the 
time, this was one of the top ten largest data breaches recorded 
(Quick et al., 2016). In the aftermath of the breach, consumer 
confidence in Target was impaired significantly. According to 
Kantar Retail, a consulting group researching consumer 
spending behaviors, the percentage of U.S. households 
shopping at Target in January 2014 was 33%. This was down 
from 43% for the same month the preceding year (Malcolm, 
2014). In Target’s annual report filed with the SEC on March 
14, 2014, the company stated: 
 
We believe the Data Breach adversely affected our 
fourth quarter U.S. Segment sales. Prior to our 
December 19, 2013, announcement of the Data 
Breach, our U.S. Segment fourth quarter comparable 
sales were positive, followed by meaningfully 
negative comparable sales results following the 
announcement. Comparable sales began to recover in 
January 2014. The collective interaction of year-over-
year changes in the retail calendar (e.g., the number of 
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days between Thanksgiving and Christmas), combined 
with the broad array of competitive, consumer 
behavioral and weather factors makes any 
quantification of the precise impact of the Data Breach 
on sales infeasible. (United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2014) 
 
While it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of the 
breach on Target’s financials, the company experienced a 1% 
decrease in revenues from 2012 to 2013, and its net income 
decreased 34.3% in that same time period. The large impact to 
net income was largely attributable to the additional costs 
associated with investigating and remediating the security 
breach.  
The financial impacts were not limited to the few months 
following the breach, however. Over the course of the next 
two years, Target continued to incur costs related directly to 
the security breach. According to Target’s 10-Q and 10-K 
filings with the SEC, the company has incurred $291 million 
in cumulative expenses related to this breach. Of this, 
approximately $90 million was offset by insurance coverage, 
leaving Target with a total direct cost of just over $200 million 
(United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2016). 
The breakdown of costs reported by Target for each quarter 
from the announcement of the breach to May 2015 are 
displayed in Figure 1: 
  
 
Figure 1: Cumulative Costs Related to Security Breach, by 
Quarter 
 
5.6 Lessons Learned 
Even though Target experienced one of the biggest data 
breaches in history, it is still a successful business with almost 
1,800 stores in North America in 2015 (Target, 2016). While 
the attack did impact the company, there are some key factors 
that had a positive impact on Target’s image. For example, 
customer loyalty is something that builds over time and even 
such a massive security flaw could be overlooked by the most 
devoted and dedicated individuals who associate themselves 
with the company. Some of them even perceived Target as a 
victim of the attackers and sympathized with the company 
during the hard times it was experiencing. 
On Target’s end, the company invested heavily in 
improving its cybersecurity operations, and in 2015 created 
the first Cyber Fusion Center, which is dedicated to preventing 
similar attacks from happening again. Brian Cornell, chairman 
and CEO of the company, said: 
 
Data security is a top priority at Target, so we 
continue to invest heavily in top talent, as well as 
technology, and focus on continually evaluating and 
evolving our processes as the landscape changes. It’s 
an important part of the $1 billion Target plans to 
invest in technology and supply chain this year. 
(Target, 2015b) 
 
Brad Maiorino, Target’s Chief Information Security 
Officer, added: 
 
We’ve got teams of Cyber Security analysts working 
round the clock. They use a mix of human 
intelligence, analytics and state-of-the-art technology 
to detect, investigate and contain threats to our 
business. Much of the work they do takes place in our 
newly opened Cyber Fusion Center (CFC). (Target, 
2015b) 
 
Another improvement that Target made was adding chip 
readers with PIN codes for customers. In fact, Target became 
the first major U.S. issuer to use chip and PIN credit cards in 
2015 (DiGangi, 2015), even as most card issuers in the United 
States were issuing less secure chip and signature cards. The 
addition of an EMV chip makes a card more difficult and 
more expensive to counterfeit. However, adding a PIN code 
on top of the EMV chip makes it even less likely that card 
information can be stolen and used to make unauthorized 
purchases.  
Last but not least, the attack impacted Target’s profits and 
caused some top management turnover. Target’s CEO at the 
time of the breach, Gregg Steinhafel, a 35-year employee of 
the company with the last 6 at the helm, resigned in May 
2014. The CIO was also replaced with Bob DeRodes, an 
executive with a very strong background in information 
security. The Target board of directors was also under 
significant pressure. A proxy firm, Institutional Shareholder 
Services, had recommended that investors oust seven board 
members. The firm said the board failed to protect the 
company from the data breach. The board members were able 
to convince shareholders to re-elect them, however, although 
the message to them was clear that future data security 
breaches were considered to be their responsibility (Basu, 
2014). The full press release from Target regarding the 
managerial changes is available in Appendix B. 
Although Target never shared directly any lessons learned, 
the examples above illustrate the company’s ambition to 
improve its security practices and offer more protection for its 
customers. Taking responsibility for the breach at the highest 
level was something that is still uncommon in organizations of 
such scale. Overall, the breach enforced many new rules and 
practices with regards to information security, as both retailers 
and customers were now aware of the consequences of such 
an attack. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
While the security breach at Target impacted a single 
corporation, it is important to note that such breaches have 
now become part of our everyday lives. It is not a matter of if, 
but when a breach will occur. Thus, the authors believe that 
Journal of Information Systems Education, Vol. 29(1) Winter 2018
15
the lessons learned from Target are valid and can be 
generalized to other organizations as well. For instance, the 
breach stimulated other retailers such as Wal-Mart and Home 
Depot to install chip readers on their POS terminals. Such best 
practices show that others realize the importance of 
strengthening their security posture and providing better 
protection against individuals with malicious intents. Further, 
Target demonstrated that they have the capacity to recover 
from such serious events due to having up-to-date disaster 
recovery/business continuity plans. These best practices 
should be followed by others who want to prepare themselves 
for the inevitable. 
In conclusion, this case study provides an objective view 
of the events surrounding the 2013 Target breach and outlines 
both the adequate and inadequate actions taken by the 
corporation. The authors’ goal is to increase students’ 
knowledge on how major organizations are impacted by such 
attacks, what can be done to limit these breaches in the future, 
and how to be better prepared to respond when they happen. 
The case study adds value to the cybersecurity curriculum as it 
requires students to put into practice the knowledge they 
gained from the classroom and apply it to a real world 
scenario. The case study reveals the complexity of the security 
breach and its impact on the business processes and customer 
trust – factors that any business professional should 
understand before going to the industry. 
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APPENDIX A – Email to Target Customers 
 
 
Source: https://consumermediallc.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/targetemailgrab.png, Accessed on January 31, 2017. 
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APPENDIX B – Target Press Release 
 
“Today we are announcing that, after extensive discussions, the board and Gregg Steinhafel have decided that now is the right 
time for new leadership at Target. Effective immediately, Gregg will step down from his positions as Chairman of the Target 
board of directors, president and CEO. John Mulligan, Target’s chief financial officer, has been appointed as interim president 
and chief executive officer. Roxanne S. Austin, a current member of Target’s board of directors, has been appointed as interim 
non-executive chair of the board. Both will serve in their roles until permanent replacements are named. We have asked Gregg 
Steinhafel to serve in an advisory capacity during this transition and he has graciously agreed. The board is deeply grateful to 
Gregg for his significant contributions and outstanding service throughout his notable 35-year career with the company. We 
believe his passion for the team and relentless focus on the guest have established Target as a leader in the retail industry. Gregg 
has created a culture that fosters innovation and supports the development of new ideas. Under his leadership, the company has 
not only enhanced its ability to execute, but has broadened its strategic horizons. He also led the company through unprecedented 
challenges, navigating the financial recession, reacting to challenges with Target’s expansion into Canada, and successfully 
defending the company through a high-profile proxy battle. Most recently, Gregg led the response to Target’s 2013 data breach. 
He held himself personally accountable and pledged that Target would emerge a better company. We are grateful to him for his 
tireless leadership and will always consider him a member of the Target family. The board will continue to be actively engaged 
with the leadership team to drive Target’s future success and will manage the transition. In addition to the appointments of the 
exceptional leaders noted above, we have also retained Korn Ferry to advise the board on a comprehensive CEO search. The 
board is confident in the future of this company and views this transition as an opportunity to drive Target’s business forward 
and accelerate the company’s transformation efforts.” 
 
Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2014/05/05/target-ceo-gregg-steinhafel-resigns-in-wake-of-data-breach-
fallout/#6abeced46e61, Accessed on January 31, 2017. 
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